In North Macedonia, waning pro-EU sentiment is opening the door to malicious intent

I remember how, less than a decade ago, many eyebrows were raised in Brussels when US Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized the growing Russian influence in Europe and said: “when it comes to Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, [North] Macedonia… they are in the line of fire.”

Those of us living in the Western Balkans were not shocked; we have been aware of Russia’s malicious intentions in the region for decades. For most of history, the southeastern part of the continent has rarely had the peace to be a theater for geopolitical competition between those eager to absorb territories and peoples under their influence.

In North Macedonia, the strongest defense mechanism against evil actors relied on the fervent pro-European faith of its citizens. We are distinguished from the countries of the region by the sheer number and intensity of the compromises and reforms we have made to join the European Union family.

Today, amid Russia’s act of aggression against Ukraine, when pro-EU sentiments should be at their strongest as the continent faces an unprecedented unity, passion for the EU in North Macedonia has almost completely eroded.

During the Cold War, Yugoslavia did not suffer complete isolation behind the Iron Curtain. Nor was it part of the Western Democratic bloc. A violent rift tore apart the once socialist federation, and the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was thrown overnight into the nation-building project, having to change its political system, ideology – and especially its flag and name – in order to participate making of the international community.

From the moment it broke away from the federation, the neighbors decided it was an excellent season to take apart its identity. In 1991, very few people were willing to bet on the country’s future when even its name sounded temporary to outsiders – the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – a trade-off intended to reduce it to a former part of a country that they ever acknowledged.

The first decision the president of the newly born state made would become a blueprint for the sobriety of a country that would always try to take the high road when trying to survive in an unstable region.

A decade later, attempts by the post-communist elites to further build the nation-state met with armed resistance from the local Albanian community. The grand political coalition accepted EU-NATO mediation and reached a compromise, becoming the only post-war Balkan country to introduce a widespread amnesty to minimize the possibility of continued ethnic conflict.

The implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement — an atypical inter-ethnic compromise — laid the foundations for broad protection for all of the country’s ethnic communities and broadly contributed to Brussels’ decision to designate the country as a candidate for EU membership.

A series of heavy pills to swallow

Our actions early on should have been an indication that the country was serious about its responsibilities as a state, including the heavy burden of making unpopular or difficult decisions for the long-term good of the nation. Instead, new challenges piled up as Western allies continued to expect North Macedonia to be the perpetual adult in the room.

The derailment of NATO integration, and with it EU membership, by Greece in 2008 over a dispute over the country’s name effectively ushered in a decade of authoritarian rule. We were no longer the top student in the Balkan classroom, because the country’s government decided to spend money and time on lavish statues, among other things, instead of the reform process.

Again, the progressive spirit of the country’s people shone through as the Colorful Revolution – so named for the paint thrown on the aforementioned images – pulled the country out of a glut, and the ensuing elections ushered in a government that was all too eager to speed up European integration.

This small country of 2 million people made headlines worldwide when it agreed to use what many would consider the very essence of its existence – its name – to put the dispute with Greece to bed.

This was not an easy pill to swallow. While both sides reached a mutual understanding of their interpretation of certain historical events, nationalists in the diaspora and at home were irked, as the agreement with the qualification “North” distinguished the identity of the state from the identity of the Macedonian people.

As expected, the cumulative effect of these arrangements was visible in the 2019 and 2020 presidential and parliamentary elections, when nationalists and populists fared much better than the pro-European bloc. The latter nevertheless managed to remain at the helm of the country, waiting for the promised grant – not only in the form of NATO membership, but also the start of negotiations with Brussels.

Unfortunately, an unfavorable scenario began to unfold. Firstly, the German Bundestag has postponed the adoption of the progress report on North Macedonia because of the European Parliament elections. Subsequently, France’s demand for a new negotiation methodology was extended for a further two years.

And finally, our eastern neighbor Bulgaria filed several formal complaints against our file, invoking an archaic Balkan understanding of identity politics over matters of history and language.

Brussels took the easy way out by insisting on a bilateral format and asking North Macedonia and Bulgaria to solve our problems themselves. This showed a blatant disregard for the imbalance in the relationship between the two: Bulgaria was a member that used its veto power not to let us in, while we depended on the unanimity of the EU.

The Bulgarian position was and remains completely incomprehensible to Macedonian citizens because its core had nothing to do with the professed European democratic values ​​and principles. After all, imposing one’s national narrative on others is a nonstarter, especially for a continent that created the Union to end the historical revisionism that had caused so much suffering and war in the past.

When the war in Ukraine is over, will Brussels go back to normal?

Two years of political obstruction in the form of a veto over North Macedonia’s membership negotiations have taken a heavy toll on the government and all Europhiles. The whole undertaking was widely seen as a betrayal of our most important national dream since independence. In 18 months, support for the EU fell sharply by 25%.

The ethnically heterogeneous structure of Macedonian society was deeply affected by the situation, and even worse, Macedonians and Albanians began to differ sharply in their support for EU membership.

Frankly, the people were right: if the country that made an unprecedented series of compromises is ultimately not rewarded, there is no guarantee that the whole journey will ever end in full membership in their lifetime.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the security, political and economic structures of the European Union. It has also changed the rationale of the enlargement process, and the EU has now turned membership into a bulwark for protection against the malign influence of Russia.

Therefore, many analysts agree that if the Kremlin intended to divert the Western alliance from the war in Ukraine, the Balkans would be a much more vulnerable arena than the Baltics because the Baltics are firmly in NATO. But the question remains: will the EU return to normal once the war in Ukraine is over?

Even as the newest member of NATO, North Macedonia is among the top five contributors to Ukraine’s defense. But despite generally more positive reports from Brussels since the stark launch of the renewed invasion of Ukraine, North Macedonia’s EU path continues to be reduced to bureaucratic rhetoric about screening and clustering.

This was not missed by the citizens, whose enthusiasm has been significantly undermined.

Until recently, despite all the difficult compromises, pro-European political forces were still able to win elections. However, nationalists and populists have gained ground in recent years and now their resurgence seems irreversible.

Frankly, North Macedonia is certainly not a perfect European country in terms of living standards or the rule of law. However, compared to its starting point seven years ago, it has made a huge leap from an internationally isolated state to a state integrated with the West.

The driving force behind change has been the determination of its citizens to act on behalf of the transformative forces of European integration. At a time when a war is being fought over interpretations of history, Macedonian citizens should be rewarded for ignoring historical tales of blood and borders. But to do that, the external incentives – mainly from the EU – must continue to flow into the country.

A lesson from recent history still applies to the Balkans: less EU presence by default means less democracy and more corruption and autocracy.

If the bloc is again absent from the region after the war in Ukraine, the next time it returns it will find the Western Balkans with barely ten million people. And the ones left will not be the ambitious, dedicated generations we still have in the region.

The other eight million will inevitably integrate into the EU, moving one by one to member states rather than waiting in their home countries – where someone else may be happy to step in and offer a much worse “alternative” to a united Europe.

Stevo Pendarovski is the fifth and current president of North Macedonia.